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ABSTRACT
Good collaboration plays an important role in effective supply chain management. The main obstacle to collaboration within
a supply chain is a conflict between each enterprise’s local optimization and the chain’s global optimization. We show that in
addition to relationships, trust, contract and other social factors, sharing and reallocation of payoff are critical to align the
objective of each member enterprise from local optimization to global optimization. We propose collaboration systems,
which take advantage of information technology in the digital economy, to set up payoff reallocation and information sharing
mechanism. These systems can be used to foster solid collaboration relationships within one supply chain. We identify the
system requirements and outline the Web-based systems schema. The collaboration systems have four indivisible
components: measuring performance; monitoring performance and payoff re-allocation; global optimization algorithm, and
reconfiguration: planning, forecasting and recommendation. The challenges, impediments and enablers to implement the
proposed collaboration systems are also discussed in the paper.
Keywords
Supply Chain Management, Collaboration, Web-based Systems, Digital Economy
INTRODUCTION
In the process of forming and maintaining a good supply chain, collaboration among various parts of the chain is crucial to
ensure actions that increase total supply chain value and at the same time benefit each participant. Supply chain collaboration
has different dimensional meanings: mutual trust, sharing of information, sharing of knowledge, relatively long planning
horizon, multiple-level relationship and process for sharing benefits and burdens (LaLonde 2004). Return on relationship will
become a core metric in this collaborative business activity. Lots of research has been done on the benefits that the
relationships in supply chain can achieve such as increased sales, lower costs from reduced inventory, fewer personnel,
improved customer service, better delivery through reduced cycle times, and increased speed of marketing new products
(Hibbard, Hogan and Smith 2003; Walter and Ritter 2003; Gummesson 2004). Collaboration is also seen as positively
impacting the public image (Mentzer, Foggin and Golicic 2000).
On the other hand, lack of good collaboration results in increased transaction cost and magnifies bullwhip effect. Chopra and
Meindl (2004) point out that the lack of supply chain coordination has the following performance effects: increasing costs
such as manufacturing cost, inventory cost, transportation cost, labor cost for shipping and receiving; enlarging replenishment
lead time; hurting the level of product availability and negatively impacting the relationship across the supply chain. They
also show that the coordination problem in supply chain mainly results from either local optimization by different nodes of
the supply chain, or an increase in information delay, distortion and variability within the supply chain. In general, incentive
obstacles arise when participants in different stages try to achieve local optimization, which leads to global non-optimization;
information obstacles refer to the situation where information flow within the supply chain is inaccurate, incomplete,
unavailable or distorted. Watson (2001) discusses the likely obstacles for the failure of integrated supply chain management
approaches in the real world.  To get improved coordination within the supply chain, we should reduce or eliminate these
obstacles, i.e. align the incentive of different participants to achieve the global optimization and improve information
assurance to accomplish the global optimization.
Previous researches have investigated the barriers to collaboration and provided some solutions to help build collaboration
from various perspectives such as relationships (McQuiston 2001), commitment (Tellefsen 2002; Friman et al. 2002), trust
(Sabath and Fontanella 2002; Bennett and Gabriel 2001), contract (Fawcett, Magnan and Williams 2004; Handfield and
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Bechtel 2002; Roxenhall and Ghauri 2004), information technology (Deeter-Schmelz and Kennedy 2004; Ryssel, Ritter and
Gemunden 2004) and other social bonds (Perry, Cavaya and Coote 2002). This paper investigates the collaboration problem
in supply chain management from a different prospective: the institute mechanism and information technology. Among the
obstacles to supply chain collaboration, the information assurance, sharing and communication problems can largely be
solved by current IT-enablers. Nonetheless, mechanisms to apply current information technology to align each entity’s
optimization from local level to global level have not been fully explored. Such an IT-enabled approach will involve not only
information technology, but also complex mechanism design. In this paper, we first introduce the economics of cooperation,
which can guide us to design the collaboration mechanism. We study, from the economic prospective, the difficulties in
maintaining the inter-organizational collaboration. While the ultimate goals for each entity on supply chain are revenue- or
profit-oriented, we emphasize the role of the payoff sharing and transfer to foster the relationship, trust and commitment.
This will result in solid collaboration within the supply chain. As Mentzer, Foggin and Golicic (2004) point out, with
increased trust from sharing revenue, information, ideas and technology, the supply chain partners act more like one virtual
enterprise. We do not mean that our proposed Web-based collaboration systems can replace the roles of relationship, trust
and commitment in the collaboration establishment. The goal of this study is that, in addition to (or along with) the
relationship, trust, commitment and other social factors, can the payoff sharing and transferring arrangement supported by
information technology be used to help foster the solid collaboration within supply chain, and how?
Our study is related to Garcia-Dastugue and Lambert (2002), which address the challenges encountered by a business firm
when choosing the Internet-enabled coordination mechanism to fit a variety of business situations in the supply chain. They
outline a framework to assist the manager with his business decisions and mainly focus on the current existing markets
available in the electronic marketplaces. However, we propose a new mechanism to align the incentive of each enterprise
from local optimization to global optimization in a supply chain. Particularly, we emphasize the revenue and cost sharing and
collaboration mechanism design.
We introduce economics of cooperation in Section II. In Section III, we analyze the collaboration systems requirements and
outline the systems schema. Implementation challenges and enablers are discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes our
study.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: ECONOMICS OF COOPERATION
In a supply chain, different participants are more likely to chase their local optimization. Each entity has its own interest and
the supply chain has “public good” properties and there is a free rider problem.
Without a centralized authority in the supply chain, each entity might behave as an opportunist. This process can be described
in a “prisoner’s dilemma” game. With cooperation, there will be pareto improvement for both parties. We look at two cases.
Suppose we have two entities, A and B in a supply chain (The analysis of 2-players game can be extended to n-players game.
For simplicity, we only demonstrate the 2-players game in this study). In the first illustration, the payoffs for A and B under
different strategies are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Payoffs in the 1st Illustration
Cooperate Not Cooperate
Cooperate 2, 2 1/2, 3
Not Cooperate 3, 1/2 1, 1
In this simple example, we can see that both entities will choose “Not Cooperate” as in Nash equilibrium. However, the other
three strategy profiles give higher total payoffs. If one entity plays “Cooperate”, the total payoffs are 3.5 if the second entity
plays “Not Cooperate”, and total payoffs are 4 if the second entity plays “cooperate” as well. Both payoffs are greater than
the payoffs of 2 under the strategy profile where neither of them chooses “Cooperate”.  The optimal option to both parties is
to cooperate and each one has payoffs of 2 without any payoff transfer. Suppose A and B initially establish a cooperation
relationship. However, since (Cooperate, Cooperate) is not a Nash equilibrium, both entities have an incentive to deviate to
“Not Cooperate”. For example, given B chooses “Cooperate”, A has an incentive to choose “Not Cooperate” because he can
get a higher payoff of 3 instead of 2. Thus, we can see that even if each entity realizes that cooperation is a better choice to
them, we still need a mechanism to have cooperation as a stable equilibrium.
Let us look at the second illustration. In this example, the Nash equilibrium is still (“Not Cooperate”, “Not Cooperate”).
However, we can see that entity A has a stronger incentive to persuade B to cooperate, as A will increase his payoff from 1 to
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two entities to set up a cooperation relationship in this scenario. They need to measure each entity’s payoff under
“cooperation” and also set up a mechanism to transfer payoff between the two entities. In this case, suppose the cooperation
is already established between the two entities. It’s obvious that B has an incentive to deviate unless his payoff is increased to
3 in the one-shot game. We can see that it is A’s willingness to transfer some payoff to B that will make the cooperation
possible. In this illustration, even if the cooperation is initially established, maintaining a stable equilibrium is still a
challenge.
Table 2. Payoffs in the 2nd Illustration
Cooperate Not Cooperate
Cooperate 4, 1 1/2, 3
Not Cooperate 3, 1/2 1, 1
From economic theory, we know that under an infinite repeated game, we can achieve the (‘Cooperate’, ‘Cooperate’) as a
Nash equilibrium by incorporating an appropriate punishment. To simplify our analysis, we use the second illustration for the
infinite repeated game. We assume that A and B agree to establish cooperation relationships by transferring payoff of 1 from
A to B. So, under the cooperation, A’s payoff is 3, and B’s payoff is 2. Although this one-shot game cannot lead to a stable
outcome of (Cooperate, Cooperate), the two players can establish a stable cooperative relation by playing an infinitely
repeated game. There are infinite strategies for each entity to play in this infinitely repeated game. In this example, suppose
both A and B use the same “Grim” strategy: plays “Cooperate” (“C”) at the first round; plays “C” if all previous rounds
consisted of (C, C); otherwise, plays “Non-Cooperate” (“N”) forever. We argue that if both players adopt such a strategy,
they can establish a stable cooperative relation that will benefit all the players, and hence the entire supply chain.
Proposition 1: If each entity applies the “Grim” strategy: plays “Cooperate” (“C”) in the first round; plays “C” if all previous
rounds consisted of (C, C), otherwise, plays “Non-Cooperate” (“N”) forever; they will reach a stable “cooperative” relation
by playing an infinitely repeated game.
Proof: The action sequence can be described as (CC, CC, CC… ) under the (Grim, Grim) strategy profile. The strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium.
The average payoff of A and B is 3...)33(1 =++=
nA
π  and 2...)22(1 =++=
nB
π as ∞→n .  Given that B plays the
“Grim” strategy, let us see whether A has an incentive to deviate from the “Grim” strategy. If he chooses to play “N” in any
pair of actions sequence, B will choose “N” forever, so will A. If this happens, the maximum average payoff that A can get is
12 because 1...)113...3(1 →+++++=
nA
π  as ∞→n . Therefore, A has no incentive to deviate from “Grim” strategy.
The same applies to B. So, (Grim, Grim) is a Nash equilibrium in this game.
There are 2 types of sub-games in this infinitely repeated game. Type 1: Proceed by all “C’s”. The two players play the same
strategy in the whole game, which has already been shown to be a Nash equilibrium. Type 2: Proceed by at least one “N”
somewhere, then the two players play “N” forever. This is a Nash equilibrium since each player wins 1 and 1 at each round
respectively, and can not do better against “N” forever. Therefore, the strategy profile (Grim, Grim) is also sub-game perfect.
QED
Through this example, we can see that if we can implement a fair payoff measurement and re-allocation mechanism, each
participant has an incentive to stick to the collaboration systems in an infinite repeated game. The difficulty in reality is
measuring each entity’s contribution to the cooperation and accomplishing the payoff transfer among the entities. With the
progress of information technology, it is now possible to establish such systems so that each entity’s contribution is computed
and payoff transfer is fairly implemented among the parties within a supply chain. The above economic analysis gives us a
guidance to design such systems so that the supply chain values increase and benefit every participant in the chain.
WEB-BASED COLLABORATION SYSTEMS SCHEMA
Systems Requirements
Since supply chain collaboration systems involve different business entities, the inter-firms system requirements are different
from the internal firm systems. Generally, in managerial level, the systems should satisfy the following requirements:
Web-based: To successfully integrate their supply chains, companies must use the Internet, Intranet and Extranet.
Reary (2002) shows that web-based systems have the following benefits: low cost of ownership, collaborative portal
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standards like HTTP, HTML, and XML. Sharma (2001) discusses how B2B marketers use the Internet to increase their
operational efficiency and effectiveness. Berthon et al. (2002) analyze how the Internet can reduce transaction costs to
facilitate more efficient exchanges and markets. In addition, the general supply chain system requirements are also applied to
the collaboration systems. We list some of system requirements from Smith (2002) as below:
Visibility and Accessibility: Ubiquitous access to real-time supply chain information for use within one organization
and to share the information with business partners and customers.
Improved Data Accuracy and Integrity: As the data accuracy and integrity directly affect the performance
measurement and associated payoff transfer, the systems need accurate and complete data inputs in order to establish a stable
cooperation.
Scalability: Try to maximize the systems’ flexibility to conform to various workloads and numbers of participants.
Systems with high scalability allow the enterprise grows without frequent upgrading the systems. Scalability has never been
more important in the current dynamic environment.
Innovation: Current systems should accommodate future information technology progresses. Future expansions and
upgrades should be considered when developing current systems.
Integrating with Enterprise Applications: Each entity’s enterprise systems should be tightly linked to the
collaboration systems to establish complete integrated systems within and among the chain participants.
Collaboration Systems Schema
The collaboration systems in supply chain management can be described in Figure 1. The bottom part of Figure 1 illustrates a
basic supply chain framework except that the cash flow is bilateral-directed instead of unilateral-directed. This implies a
payoff transfer in the new schema. The collaboration systems are explained in details below:
Stage 1: Measuring Performance
In this stage, each entity in the chain sends relevant data to the collaboration systems. This can be done by integrating each
entity’s ERP with the collaboration systems. With different information sent by different partners in the chain, data filtering
is needed to ensure data accuracy, completeness and integrity. The purpose of this process is to prepare sufficient data and
information for algorithm computation that measures each entity’s performance. In this stage, the systems will calculate each
entity’s contribution to the global optimization, that is, the supply chain values, and each entity’s payoff from the supply
chain. For each entity’s payoff, the systems need to identify which part is based on activities that do not affect the
effectiveness of the supply chain and which part is based on supply chain partners’ coordination. In certain circumstances,
one entity might sacrifice its own interests to achieve a global optimization for the supply chain. Its loss due to cooperation is
also needed to be estimated. In most cases, there is an asymmetry between one entity’s contribution to and its benefit from
supply chain collaboration. This implies that payoff transformation is required within the supply chain.
We develop a supply chain value assessment (SCVA) framework to address the above question. SCVA is a framework that
links performance metrics of specific supply chain to the desired financial outcomes (global optimization). Supply chain
value assessment is more than diagnostic; it is a framework for building fact-based value propositions to align each entity’s
objective from local optimization to global optimization.
Stage 2: Monitoring and Payoff Reallocation
In this stage, the systems mainly compare “what each entity should do” and “what each entity has done”. “What each entity
should do” is from the reconfiguration: planning, forecasting and recommendation (see Stage 3 next) from the previous cycle.
“What each entity has done” is from the measuring performance stage. The comparison result is important to diagnose
whether any entity deviates from “cooperation”, particularly, for its own interest. For example, if one entity’s rapid revenue
increase (local objective) results from deviating from the global objective, further examination is needed to see whether it is
due to market change or the entity’s self-interests drive. If one entity’s increasing revenue results in decreasing global
revenue, more investigation should be conducted and constructive advices should be given to the entity. As we mentioned
above,  the  supply  chain  is  a  long-term  relation.  In  order  to  stabilize  collaboration  in  the  chain,  any  entity  that  purposely
violates cooperation for its own interest should be punished like in the “grim” strategy.
After the monitoring processes, the sources of supply chain values become clear, and the contribution of each entity is
quantified. Payoffs should be transferred among different entities according to pre-determined reallocation rules or
agreements. In general, the reallocation payoff should be based on each entity’s contribution to and benefit from the supply
chain.
Stage 3: Global Optimization Algorithm
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In this stage, the systems estimate and simulate the optimal global revenue that the supply chain can achieve under various
business environments such as different demand and prices in the next period. The purpose of this stage is to give operational
guidance for each entity so that every entity can perform better for the whole chain in the next round. By tightly integrating
pricing actions and supply chain actions, global optimization algorithm (GOA) provides the companies with the tools they
require to quickly and effectively achieve optimization goals (Phillips 2001).  We can use current information technology and
operation management to plan and make decisions at the tactical and operational level. In this stage, simulation or calibration
should be used to test different market conditions.
Figure 1. The Schema of SCM Coordination Systems
Stage 4: Reconfiguration: Planning, Forecasting and Recommendation
In this stage, the systems conduct joint business planning for all  the entities in the chain. To have optimal productions and
operations, the planning is mainly based on global optimization computing results contingent on different situations. As there
are uncertainties in the future, forecasting is needed to redefine the planning. The planning also needs to be flexible so that it
is still valid when market conditions change. Also some entities may withdraw from the chain, and some new entities may
join. Based on the planning, forecasting and new partnerships, the systems propose an appropriate set of recommendations to
each entity in the supply chain. After getting the recommendations, each entity has to adjust its activities to reflect the core
spirit and requirements of global optimization in collaboration relationships.
SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AND ENABLERS
Collaboration requires redefinition of company goals and direction. It requires trust among partners. To have successful
collaboration systems, partners must be willing to share their promotion schedules, POS data and inventory data. While
redefining a company's direction is no easy task, the benefits can be great for the companies that do manage the leap across
traditional barriers (Anderson 2000). Achieving these gains, however, requires a comprehensive strategy for implementing
GOA capabilities. Creating a collaborative supply network typically requires a sponsor — a leader in the chain who can offer
the required resources for the initial creation of the large-scale supply network. A supply chain consortium might be one of
the solutions for the ownership of the systems. In addition, we need to bear in mind the following challenges:
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Multiple industries with own peculiarities: As the entities in the supply chain involve different multiple industries with their
own peculiarities, business practices and contractual requirement, etc., how to align their interests and integrate their
activities towards the supply chain needs to be further addressed.
Multi-Chains involvement problem: One firm might join several supply chains. For this entity, it will be quite difficult to
optimize only one of the supply chains. As the entity joins more supply chains, it will not care only about one coordination
system. Such an entity can either join only one supply chain, or integrate other supply chains into one collaborative system to
solve this problem. However, as the number of entities increases, we require more efficient algorithm and knowledge
management for the expanded systems.
Integration with ERP: It is desirable to integrate the collaboration systems within supply chain management with each firm’s
Enterprise Recourse Planning systems. For example, Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) is a key part of an SCM
application. Most APS products have been embedded with sophisticated optimization logic, making APS almost synonymous
with supply chain optimization.
Information accuracy: One challenge to the proposed systems is achieving a credible guarantee that the data and information
submitted are correct. Although each entity realizes that collaboration and cooperation will achieve higher global payoff, the
complicated systems, data missing, incompleteness and inaccuracy will affect the performance measurement and payoff
reallocation. Highly reliable database management and communication within the systems is necessary.
Other some of the impediments to collaboration from Quinn (2001) are summarized below:
Time investment: Collaboration  takes  time  and  requires  hard  work.  To  get  people  involved,  we  need  to  show  them  the
expected benefits so that each entity has a high incentive to invest.
Conventional accounting practices: The conventional accounting practices impede to collaboration as they focus on the
traditional accounting role for a single firm, rather than measure the cross-company values.
Inadequate communications: Inadequate communication among supply chain partners will increase the potential problems
exponentially.
Inconsistency: If some entities behavior strategically, these behavioral attitudes and operational execution are inconsistent at
all interfaces in the supply chain relationship, and result in other entities’ strategic behavior.
Although it is not easy to build such collaboration systems within any supply chain, some key collaboration enablers should
be identified to use (Quinn 2001).
Common interest and clear expectations: As all entities share the collaboration's outcome, this helps ensure long-term
commitment. In addition to relationship, trust and commitment, contracting helps to set up clear payoff and cost sharing for
the collaboration systems among the entities involved.
Openness and trust: Openness and trust help to share information, discuss their practices and processes, and solve some
potential problems related to systems and benefit/cost sharing.
Leadership: One leading entity can help to move collaboration forward.
Cooperation first, punishment last: When some problems about relationship happen, right approach might be to jointly solve
the problem. Punishment might be the last alternative.
The benefits from good collaborations are obvious. Therefore, we need to build such collaboration systems to materialize
these values. Business entities, especially the executive managers, should understand the implementation challenges and try
to use all kinds of enablers to make the collaboration systems successful.
CONCLUSIONS
Good collaboration plays an important role in effective supply chain management. The main obstacle to collaboration within
a supply chain is the conflict between various enterprises’ local optimization and the chain’s global optimization. We show
that in addition to relationships, trust, contract and other social factors, the payoff sharing and reallocation is critical to
establishing collaboration among different business entities. By taking advantage of information technology progresses in the
digital economy, we propose collaboration systems, which can be used to foster and establish solid and long-term
collaboration relationships within a supply chain. We identify the systems requirements in the digital economy environment.
We outline one conceptual framework of Web-based collaboration systems, where information technology and Internet are
considered as significant enablers to initiate and implement such systems. The collaboration systems have four indivisible
components: measuring performance; monitoring performance and payoff re-allocation; global optimization algorithm, and
reconfiguration: planning, forecasting and recommendation. We also discuss the challenges, impediments and enablers to the
collaboration systems. It is obvious that great efforts are required to materialize the proposed collaboration systems. We hope
that our conceptual analysis offers some insights into building an effective collaboration in supply chain management and
more business firms can create and capture the values derived from the digital economy.
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